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ARGUMENT
POINT I
RESPONDENT FAILS TO EVEN ADDRESS SEVERAL MAJOR ARGUMENTS IN
APPELLANTS OPENING BRIER
A.

Respondent fails to challenge Petitioner's claim that she has done an excellent job as
primary caretaker of the minor child since at least December 23, 1994.
Petitioner believes that in considering the best interests of the minor child, Jackson, the

trial judge should have given greater weight than he did to the fact that Jackson had lived
with Petitioner for five and a half years prior to trial, with the past three years where
Respondent was out of the home, and later moved to southern Utah- Petitioner believes
it is significant that in his responsive brief, Respondent does not challenge the fact that
Petitioner had done an excellent job as primary caretaker prior to the time of trial; nor
could he since this was the finding of fact of the trial judge. See Pet.Op.Br. pp. 8-9.
Petitioner pointed out that at least since Respondent's voluntary move away from the child
to southern Utah two and a half years prior to trial, and in actuality for the child's whole
life, Petitioner had been Jackson's primary caretaker; and had obviously done an excellent
job with no deficits in parenting ability ever found by the custody evaluator or the judge in
this case.
B.

Respondent fails to adequately respond to Petitioner's argument that the trial court
failed to address the materiality and substantiality of the changed circumstances it
found by considering their effect on the custodial relationship between mother and
child.
Petitioner argued in her opening brief that even though the trial court found as a

matter of fact that there were changed circumstances based upon the moves and remarriages
of the parties, the Court erred in failing to make any findings as to whether the changed
circumstances it found were material as required by the Utah Supreme Court and Utah
1

Court of Appeals in the cases of Elmer v. Elmer, 776 P.2d 599 (Utah 1989), Paryzek v.
Paryzek, 116 P.2d 78 (Utah App. 1989), Stevens v. Collard, 837 P.2d 593 (Utah App. 1992),
and Becker v. Becker, 694 P.2d 608 (Utah 1984). See Pet.Op.Br. pp. 15-19. Petitioner argued
that these cases stand for the proposition that, in addition to finding that there have been
changes of circumstance since the time the initial divorce decree was entered, a trial court
must consider the materiality of those changed circumstances as they relate to the parenting
ability or the functioning of the then presently existing custodial relationship before it can
modify a decree of divorce relating to child custody.

The only response made by

Respondent suggests that the Becker case, supra, relied upon by Petitioner can somehow be
distinguished on the basis that in Becker, the Respondent was awarded sole custody of the
parties' minor child. Respondent claims that did not occur in the instant case, and accuses
Petitioner of misstating the facts relating to custody.
However, Petitioner pointed out in her opening brief that although the parties
stipulated to joint custody, they also stipulated to Petitioner being awarded sole physical
custody and control of the minor child, with a reasonable right of visitation awarded to
Respondent pursuant to the minimum visitation schedule of the State of Utah.1 The fact
is, Respondent stipulated that Petitioner should be awarded the sole physical custody and
control of the parties' minor child, and this was the existing custody arrangement at the time
of trial of the petition to modify in the instant matter. Given that circumstance, it is
disingenuous of the Respondent to attempt to distinguish the Utah Supreme Court case of

1

In fact, paragraph 2 of the Divorce Decree reads, "The parties are the parents of
one (1) minor child, Jackson Wade Carpenter, born May 28, 1992, and both parties are
fit and proper persons and should be awarded the joint care, custody and control of the
minor child. The plaintiff is to be awarded the physical custody and control of the minor
child." (R. 24, 25).
2

Becker v. Becker, supra, on the basis that in Becker the Respondent was awarded sole legal
custody of the parties' minor child, as well as physical custody and control. Petitioner
maintains that the question to be addressed by the Court with regard to the Becker case
relates specifically to the holding in that case which was that where a prior custody
arrangement had been determined, the party moving to modify the prior custody situation
must show,
. . . in addition to the existence and extent of the change, that the change
is significant in relation to the modification sought. The asserted change
must, therefore, have some material relationship to and substantial affect
on parenting ability or the functioning of the presently existing custodial
relationship. In the absence of an indication that the change has or will
have such effect, the materiality requirement is not met. Accordingly, it
is not sufficient merely to allege a change which, although otherwise
substantial does not substantially affect the custodial relationship.
694 P.2d at 610; PetOp.Br. p. 15 (emphasis added).
In her opening brief, Petitioner maintained that the trial court in the instant matter
made nofindingsof fact whatsoever regarding the "substantial affect on the parenting ability
or the functioning of the presently existing custodial relationship" of the substantial changes
he found, i.e., both parents' movement away from the family home at the time the Divorce
Decree was entered, and remarriage of both parents. Petitioner argued the mere fact that
the Court found that the parties' child was thriving, well adjusted and happy in Petitioner's
care at the time of the trial of this case in December 1997, coupled with the other comments
of the Court favorable to the Petitioner mother, are an indication that the changes the
Court found were not "material" and did not have a "material relationship to and substantial
affect on the parenting ability or the functioning of the presently existing custodial
relationship."

3

Even more important, however, is the fact that Respondent in his brief makes no
mention whatsoever of Petitioner's argument that the Utah Supreme Court in Elmer v.
Elmer, supra, and the Utah Court of Appeals in Paryzek v. Paryzek, supra, clearly establish
the law in Utah with regard to the issue of materiality as it relates to the changed
circumstances rule by providing that a trial court should look specifically at four items: (1)
the duration of the initial custody arrangement; (2) the age of the child; (3) the nature of
the relationship that has developed between the child and the custodial and non-custodial
parents; and (4) how well the child is thriving physically, mentally and emotionally.
Petitioner went to great lengths to point out to the Court that in reviewing those four
standards which are the established common law of the State of Utah as it relates to child
custody cases, the trial court found each of these standards to be in favor of the Petitioner
mother. See Pet.Op.Br. pp. 12-15. In fact, Petitioner pointed out that despite the hairsplitting efforts of Respondent in his brief to try to distinguish the custody situation in the
Becker case as noted previously, the trial court here found, "In this case Mrs. Hudema has
had the primary custody of Jackson for over two years." (emphasis added) (R. 587; Add. 1
p. 7, Pet.Op.Br. p. 13). Furthermore, Petitioner pointed out that even the custody evaluator
found, "Jackson appears equally bonded to both parents. He has a definite place in their
hearts, their lives, and their homes." (emphasis supplied). (R. 120, Ex. D-10, p. 8; Pet.Op.Br.
Add. 5 p. 8, last para.).
Finally, with regard to the issue of "how well the child is thriving physically, mentally
and emotionally," Petitioner pointed out that the trial court found as follows:
In this case Mrs. Hudema has had the primary custody of Jackson for over
two years. The evaluation indicated that Jackson was a well adjusted,
happy and precocious child who is doing well. There were no indications
of any emotional or psychological problems other than when visitation was
changed between parents, that Jackson exhibited periods where he was
4

more reserved and quiet following his exchange. This factor favors Mrs.
Hudema in evaluating the best interest in establishing custody of (sic) this
case.
(R. 587; Pet.Op.Br. Add. 1 p. 7 H 4) (emphasis added).
In addition, the court drew the following Conclusion of Law:
. . . a case such as this is a very difficult case . . . The Court is not deciding
between a good parent and a bad parent in that Jackson has two good
parents. The Court knows that both parents in this case love and care for
Jackson a great deal and that Jackson loves and cares for his parents with
all his heart. . . . One of the tragedies of divorce is the Court is often
required to make a custody determination that requires a decision between
excellent parents. In exercising this significant discretion, I must be guided
at all times by the best interest of Jackson. In this case, I have the
assurance of knowing that whichever home Jackson is in at any given time,
that he is going to find the utmost of love, care, attention, and
understanding from both his parents and step-parents. . . . However, this
Court is faced with the reality that the joint custody that was originally
entered is not possible and it is not in the best interest of Jackson to
continue.
(R. 591, 592; Pet.Op.Br. Add. 1 pp. 11-12, Conclusion of Law No. 1) (emphasis added).
Thus, Petitioner pointed out that the rule of law in this state as established by the Utah
Supreme Court in Elmer and subsequent cases, and the Utah Court of Appeals in Paryzek
and subsequent cases, if applied to the instant case, shows that all of the factors cited in
those cases mitigate in favor of the application of the principle of res judicata in the instant
case and maintaining custody of the minor child with the Petitioner mother. Although
circumstances had clearly changed as found by the court, there simply was no indication that
those changed circumstances were material, and it was error for the trial court not to have
ruled in favor of Petitioner on this basis.
Petitioner wishes to further point out to the Court that she cited the Utah Court of
Appeals case of Fullmer v. Fullmer, 761 P.2d 942 (Utah App. 1988) as a case which
paralleled on virtually all fours the facts in the instant case. In that case, the Utah Court
5

of Appeals reversed the trial court where it found that all of the four factors previously
mentioned were met by the custodial parent, and the trial court had committed error by
removing the child from the then existing custody arrangement. It is significant that, despite
only using 32 pages of the 50 pages he was allotted for his responsive brief, Respondent
chose not to respond in any manner whatsoever to the argument that the Fullmer case is
solid precedent for this Court to reverse the trial judge in the instant case.
C.

Respondent fails to respond to Petitioner's argument that the Court erred as a matter
of law in changing custody where the child was thriving, well adjusted and happy
pursuant to the requirements of Parvzek v. Paryzek.
Petitioner argued as a major point in her opening brief that the trial court erred as a

matter of law in changing custody where it found that the subject child was thriving, well
adjusted and happy in the care and physical custody of Petitioner. Petitioner pointed out
that the Utah Court of Appeals case of Paryzek v. Paryzek, 776 P.2d 78 (Utah App. 1989),
was a case where this Court had ruled that where the call is a close one, a child's need for
stability, and the potential harm to the child if the custody arrangement is changed, are
factors for the Court to consider and maintain custody in the custodial parent as a matter
of law. See Pet.Op.Br. pp. 19-24.
While Respondent correctly pulls dicta out of the Paryzek case which suggests that
generally the child's interest and the stability of the present environment is one of numerous
factors to be considered by a court in a custody determination, Respondent fails to present
any argument whatsoever to this Court as to why the facts in the Paryzek case are not
squarely on all fours with the facts in the instant case as alleged by Petitioner; and thus solid
precedent for awarding custody of Jackson to Petitioner as a matter of law. The Court will
note that Petitioner argued that in a case subsequent to Paryzek, Barnes v. Barnes, 857 P.2d
257 (Utah App. 1993), the Court of Appeals reversed a custody award on the basis that the
6

trial court had found that the children seemed "happy and well adjusted, bright and
articulate" in the care of the then custodial parent. In that case, as in the instant case, the
Court relied upon a child custody evaluation that recommended a child be removed from
his present home to the other parent's home. Again, this case is squarely on all fours with
the instant case, but Respondent chose not to address this case at all in his responsive brief.
Finally, Petitioner argued that the trial court erred in not making even one single
finding of fact as it related to the impact upon the minor child of the change of custody in
this case. Petitioner pointed out that the trial judge heard the case in December of 1997,
but felt it was in the child's best interests to allow the mother to retain custody until the
child completed kindergarten in May of 1998, which was approximately six months from the
time the judge orally made his findings. Petitioner argued that the judge certainly was
confident the child would continue to be happy, well adjusted and thriving in the custody
of his mother another six months after he made his decision to change custody. The Court
must have been concerned about a possible negative impact on the child of the change of
custody, and seemed to assume that allowing the child tofinishkindergarten with his mother
in Arizona where they lived, would be in his best interests. It is extremely difficult for
Petitioner, and any reasonable thinking person, to presume that the presently existing
custody arrangement at the time of trial was harmful or detrimental to the child in any way
whatsoever if the Court was willing to allow the child to remain with the Petitioner mother
another six months. Interestingly enough, the Respondent did not even address this issue
at any point in his brief.
Furthermore, Petitioner argued in her opening brief that since no psychological tests
had been completed upon the child, there was no real evidence presented to the trial court
as to the impact the change of custody might have on the child. The custody evaluator had
7

testified that Jackson had a strong bond with the father, and therefore, she assumed there
would be no detrimental impact on the child of a change of custody. However, Petitioner
would have the Court consider that the judge knew for certain that by leaving the child with
the mother for an additional six months beyond the date of trial there would be no
problems, but made nofindingsof fact whatsoever as to whether or not there would be any
impact on the child when custody was changed to the father. This is an appalling flaw and
error in the trial court's ultimatefindings,conclusions and order changing custody. It should
also be very illuminating for the Court that Respondent chose not to even address this issue.
Finally, this Court should take note of the custody evaluator's conclusion that: "In my
observation of Jackson, and my questioning of Abby, the conclusion I draw is that Jackson
is a perfectly settled, happy child with no signs of disturbance." (R. 120 Ex. D-10 p. 4;
Pet.Op.Br. Add. 5 p. 4).
POINT II
RESPONDENT FAILS TO EVEN ADDRESS PETITIONER'S ARGUMENT
THAT THE TRIAL COURTS CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ARE NOT
SUPPORTED BY THE FINDINGS OF FACT IT MADE IN THIS CASE.
Respondent chooses to begin his brief by alleging that Petitioner has failed to marshal
the evidence in favor of the trial court's decision. Respondent spends several pages citing
cases that suggest that when the trial court'sfindingsare attacked, the evidence indeed must
be marshaled. However, Respondent has totally misanalyzed the major argument made by
Petitioner, that even if the trial court's findings of fact were supported by evidence, the
conclusions of law which resulted in the order for a change of custody in this case were not
supported by thefindingsof fact. There is nothing in the law that Petitioner can find that
suggests that where conclusions of law are being attacked a requirement exists to "marshal
the evidence." Rather, as Respondent points out in his brief, the requirement of marshaling
8

the evidence occurs only under circumstances where a specific finding of fact is being
attacked. Petitioner maintains that where she attacked findings of fact she indeed has
marshaled the evidence; but the court should understand that Respondent has chosen not
to respond at all to the argument that the findings of fact do not support the conclusions
of law and the order of change of custody.
Petitioner took great pains to go into detail regarding the 15 factors a court is required
to look at by virtue of Utah common law as well as Rule 4-903 of the Utah Code of Judicial
Administration. Petitioner went through each of these factors carefully and showed the
Court that of the 15 factors (actually six factors and nine subfactors), nine factors were equal
and even, two factors were in favor of maintaining the child with the Petitioner mother, and
four factors were in favor of changing custody to the Respondent father. Petitioner argued
that, given the virtually equal nature of all of these factors (and even with those the trial
court found in favor of one party or the other the court found only a "slight" advantage for
the party the factor favored), the trial court should have ruled on the side of "the general
interest in continuing previously determined custody arrangements where the child is happy
and well adjusted," since it found that to be the case. In fact as noted in the opening brief,
the trial court specifically found this critical factor to favor Petitioner (R. 587; Pet.Op.Br. p.
26).
Respondent and his counsel however, fault Petitioner for going through these factors
individually, and claim that the only thing the Court should consider is that the judge looked
at all the factors as a whole and found that custody of the minor child should be changed.
However, Respondent's argument defies logic in that he would have this Court simply say,
"Well, the trial judge looked at all the factors as a whole and ruled in favor of Respondent,
and therefore, we should not look at any of the individual factors, and we should ignore
9

Petitioner's arguments as to those individual factors altogether." This conclusion simply does
not make sense! If this Court considers that nine of the factors were even, two were in
favor of maintaining custody in Petitioner, and only four favored changing custody to
Respondent, it certainly is perfectly appropriate for this Court to review those four factors
in this "close case." This would be particularly true where the Petitioner makes the
argument on appeal that the trial court's conclusions of law are not supported by the
findings of fact it made in this case. Utah, as well as eveiy other court in the land, has a
long history of reviewing separate findings of fact to see if they are adequately supported
by evidence, and to determine whether or not they support the conclusions of law ultimately
reached by the Court. In Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38 (Utah 1982), the Utah
Supreme Court held:
The trial court must enter specific findings on the factors relied upon in
awarding custody. . . . "For this court to be in a position to review the
propriety of the trial court's order, it is necessary that proper findings of
fact and conclusions of law be made pursuant to Rule 52(a), Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure." . . . This requirement of written findings applies with
even greater force to orders awarding or modifying the custody of a child.
649 P.2d at 42.
See also, Chandler v. West, 610 P.2d 1299,1301 (Utah 1980); Stoddard v. Stoddard, 642 P.2d
743 (Utah 1982).
Therefore, it can be seen that for an appellee to argue that the appellate court should
ignore the individual findings of fact and simply look to the conclusion as a whole reached
by the trial court is a clearly erroneous argument that must be rejected by this Court.

10

A.

Respondent totally ignores Petitioner's argument that the trial court'sfindingregarding
the moral character of the mother and lack offindingas to how it may affect the minor
child was clearly erroneous.
Petitioner argued in her opening brief that the trial judge found as one of the four

factors in Respondent's favor that Petitioner's relocation to Arizona to move in with her
fiancee approximately one and a half months prior to her marriage constituted a "lack of
moral example to the child based upon community standards and also the standards the
parties have agreed that the child should be raised in." (R. 588, 589; Pet.Op.Br. Add. 1, F.
of F. No. 6 pp. 8, 9). Petitioner argued that the child was barely over five years old at the
time of the move, and that there was absolutely no evidence at trial from the custody
evaluator or any witness with regard to how Petitioner's relocation to Arizona to move in
with herfiancee,approximately one and a half months prior to her marriage, had any impact
on the child whatsoever, let alone moral impact. Therefore, it is well settled that under
circumstances where there is simply no evidence whatsoever to marshal, Petitioner cannot
be held to the principle of being required to marshal the evidence in support of the finding.
See Barnes v. Barnes, 857 P.2d 257, 259 (Utah App. 1993).
It seems incomprehensible to Petitioner and an example of the incredible arrogance of
Respondent in this matter, that Respondent failed to even address this issue in his brief,
despite the fact that he used only 32 of the 50 pages he was allotted. Petitioner took great
pains to point out to the Court that the alleged demonstration of a lack of moral example
has to be seen as having a material impact on the child to be used as a basis for changing
custody (Pet.Op.Br pp. 30-33). Petitioner cited several Utah Supreme Court cases which
had come to this conclusion.2
2

Stuber v. Stuber, 244 P.2d 650, 652 (1952); see also, Sparks v. Sparks, 508 P.2d 531
(1973) (upholding denial of petition to transfer custody to father on ground that mother
11

The Court should also be aware of the fact that in her custody evaluation, Margaret
Chapman wrote, "The moral character and emotional stability of both natural parents, and
both step-parents is sound, and without question." (emphasis added) (R. 120 Ex. D-10, p.
5, Pet.Op.Br. Add. 5 p. 5).
In conclusion, the trial court's Finding of Fact on the morality issue was clearly
erroneous and totally without evidence as to its impact on the minor child.
B.

Respondent totally ignores Petitioner's argument that the trial court's finding of fact
that the father was more religiously compatible with the child than the mother was
clearly erroneous.
Petitioner noted in her opening brief that the trial court's finding that she would not

likely participate as much in the LDS religion with the minor child as would Respondent
constituted a misreading on the part of the trial judge of the religious compatibility issue as
it relates to child custody cases. The Court stated: "In this case, the court would find that
both have religious compatibility with Jackson. Both have the same desires. However, the
court would find that there's (sic) greater religious compatibility of Jackson with his father
because of his participation with Jackson in those activities" (R. 727 p. 16; 589, 590).
Petitioner marshaled the evidence in support of the judge's conclusion by specifically citing
Respondent's testimony in this regard, and the custody evaluation. See Pet.Op.Br. pp. 34-36.
While it is true that Petitioner testified that at times she would drop off the child at
church (while other times attending church with him), Respondent claimed to have always
attended church with the child during his visitation periods. Petitioner argued that this
finding of fact by the trial court is an error of law and is a basis for granting a new trial; or

lived with a man to whom she was not married); Dearden v. Dearden, 388 P.2d 230
(1964) (modifying award of custody to father granted by trial court on ground that
mother committed adultery).
12

in conjunction with the other arguments made by Petitioner, is a basis for reversing the trial
court and ordering custody be awarded to the Petitioner mother. Petitioner argued the trial
court misapplied this religious compatibility principle and cited the case of Larson v. Larson,
888 P.2d 719 (Utah App. 1994) as an example of the manner in which the trial court should
apply this particular factor in child custody cases. Among other things, the Utah Court of
Appeals stated ". . . religious compatibility is only a factor when there has been a showing
that specific religious beliefs or practices are contrary to the child's general welfare."
(emphasis added). 888 P.2d at 724. Petitioner also asks the Court to note that the facts in
the Larson case were strikingly similar to the facts in the instant case. In fact, Petitioner
noted in her opening brief that she was continuing Jackson's religious activities in the LDS
Church while in Arizona; and that she and Jackson attended church nearly every week; and
that Gilbert, Arizona, has a large LDS population. She further noted that neither she nor
her husband's religious beliefe are contrary to Jackson's general welfare in any way; and that
she intended to continue to foster Jackson's religious upbringing in the most appropriate
manner possible, and intended to give him a solid religious and moral foundation. (R. 474,
R. 725, pp. 98, 99; R. 726, pp. 352-354).
Since Respondent chose to ignore Petitioner's argument altogether, this Court is
entitled to infer that Respondent must believe this argument is correct. Petitioner would
urge the Court to conclude that the trial court's determination that the religious
compatibility factor favors a transfer of custody from Petitioner to Respondent is based
upon a clearly erroneous standard, and is a solid basis for reversal. Furthermore, even if
this were not the case, this Court is asked to take notice of the fact that the court made no
findings as to how the child is impacted by the slight difference in church attendance with
each individual parent.
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C.

Respondent totally ignores Petitioner's argument that the trial court's finding that the
kinship factor favored a change of custody was clearly erroneous.
Petitioner argued in her opening brief that the trial court found that Respondent and

his wife had extensive extended family in southern Utah. He also found,
Mrs. Hudema also has significant family members also located in the
southern Utah area. Mrs. Hudema has no extended family at this time
living in Arizona. In this area, the court finds that although this is a
limited factor, Jackson would have more contact with extended family
living in southern Utah than in Arizona.
(R. 590; Pet.Op.Br. Add. 1, F. of F. No. 11, p. 10).
Petitioner believes that the only evidentiary support for the court's finding in this regard
would be found in the custody evaluation where Ms. Chapman states:
Wade has extended family members in Utah, as does Abby. Abby will
have less physical contact with her extended family members because of
the distance involved. I have attached with the report a list of the relatives
of Wade, Abby, and Stacy, (please see attachments). Wade and Abby
have numerous relatives in the immediate or surrounding area close to
Brian Head. Jackson knows and loves these family members and has a
relationship with them. It would be important for Jackson to have the
continued love and contact with these extended family members who can
enrich his life and give him a sense of belonging and heritage, which is an
important factor for any child.
See R. 120 Ex. D-10, p. 5, 6; PetOp.Br. Add. 5 p. 5, 6).
It is unclear as to what evidence the trial judge relied upon to draw the conclusion that
this "limited factor" as the court called it, mitigated more in favor of Respondent than
Petitioner. If the court was relying on the fact that Petitioner had no extended family living
in Arizona, it should have considered the fact that the custody evaluator found that
Petitioner has extensive extended family living in southern Utah where Respondent's
extended family apparently resided. Petitioner pointed out that in Larson v. Larson, 888
P.2d 719 (Utah App. 1994), the Utah Court of Appeals held, "While the close proximity of
the children's friends and extended family is an appropriate factor for the court to consider,
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this, by itself, is insufficient to disturb a previously determined custody arrangement in which
the children are happy and well-adjusted." 888 P.2d at 726.
Respondent's total failure to even address Petitioner's claim of error in the lower
court's finding that the kinship factor favored a change of custody, must be seen as
capitulation to the argument presented.
D. Respondent failed to address the custody evaluator's change of position regarding the
bonding of the child with his parents.
Petitioner pointed out in her opening brief at pp. 37-40 that the custody evaluator
Margaret Chapman had stated in the evaluation, "Jackson is bonded to both parents. He
is perfectly comfortable with each of them. He is comfortable with Stacy (Respondent's new
wife) and with Craig (Petitioner's new husband)." (R. 120, Ex. D-10, p. 4; Pet.Op.Br. Add.
5 p. 4).

Additionally, in a later section the custody evaluator states, "Jackson appears

equally bonded to both parents. He has a definite place in their hearts, their lives and their
homes." (emphasis added). (Id. p. 8; Pet.Op.Br. Add. 5, p. 8). Petitioner marshaled the facts
supporting the trial court'sfindingthat the child had a stronger bond with Respondent than
with Petitioner by quoting on page 38 of her opening brief the testimony of Margaret
Chapman at trial where she clearly changed her opinion significantly by testifying that it
appeared to her that Jackson had a stronger bond with his father than with his mother.
Petitioner argued in her opening brief that this change of position was totally unexplained
by the custody evaluator and suggested that contacts with Respondent and Respondent's
attorney between the time of the custody evaluation and the time of trial may have played
a part in the evaluator clearly changing her opinion regarding the equality of the bonding
between the evaluation and the trial itself. Although Respondent bristles in his responsive
brief at this allegation, and calls the allegations of the evaluator's numerous ex parte
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contacts with Respondent and his attorney "disingenuous, a complete lie, and a complete
mis-statement of the record" (Resp.Br. p. 20), Ms. Chapman clearly admitted on the stand
under cross examination that she was called more by Respondent than she was by Petitioner
(R. 725 pp. 49-50). Ms. Chapman also admitted that she met with Respondent and his wife
at Respondent's attorney's office the day before she prepared the custody report in this case
(R. 725. 49-50). Even more important, she admitted that prior to trial she had ex parte
conversations with Respondent's attorney to prepare her testimony for trial, despite the fact
that she was appointed by the court as an independent evaluator (R. 725, p. 54, 55). She
admitted that Mr. Park explained how he would be questioning her.
Therefore, for Respondent to allege that the statement made in Petitioner's opening
brief regarding ex parte contacts between the custody evaluator and Respondent's attorney
was "a complete lie" is in and of itself untruthful and can be seen from the record. It is
understandable why Respondent would be so sensitive with regard to this allegation by
Petitioner because there is no evidence in the record whatsoever that Petitioner's attorney
met ex parte with the custody evaluator in an attempt to go over her testimony. If we are
searching for a reason why the evaluator may have changed her opinion from one of equal
bonding with both parents to one of a stronger bond with one of the parents between the
time of her custody evaluation and her trial testimony, this is one explanation for why such
a change of heart may have occurred.
Further support for the improper manner in which Respondent's counsel undoubtedly
briefed and questioned the custody evaluator prior to trial is found in Ms. Chapman's
testimony regarding an allegation that Petitioner had taken the minor child to the Greek
Orthodox Church. The exchange between Petitioner's counsel and Ms. Chapman on cross
examination was as follows:
16

Q. Now, your report . . . with regard to religious compatibility . . . You
indicated that you'd been told that Jackson had gone to the Greek
Orthodox Church?
A I was told that today, I think. I did not talk to Abby about that.
Q You were told that by Mr. Carpenter, weren't you?
A (inaudible response)
Q Did you approach Abby to find out about that?
A Actually, I didn't talk to Mr. Carpenter. So it would have been Mr. Park.
Q Okay. And you had conversations with Mr. Park to prepare you for your testimony
today?
A Yes, I have.
Q Even though you were appointed by the court as an independent evaluator?
A That's true. Mr. Park was explaining to me how he would be questioning me.
R. 725 p. 54, 55.
The truth is, that Petitioner testified she had never taken Jackson to a Greek Orthodox
Church (or a Russian Orthodox Church). In the examination by her counsel, the following
exchange occurred:
Q (BY MR. CHIPMAN) Okay. Now, you testified that you have never taken him
(the minor child Jackson) to the Russian (sic Greek) Orthodox church?
A Yes.
Q Were you surprised to hear the custody evaluator saying that she had been told he
had been taken A Yes.
Q ~ to a Russian (sic Greek) Orthodox church by counsel?
A Yes.
R. 725 p. 110.
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While it is commendable that counsel allowed Ms. Chapman's reference to Jackson
being taken to a Greek Orthodox Church to be stricken, Respondent's counsel cannot
escape the fact that his ex parte meeting prior to trial with the court's expert witness to
allegedly prepare her testimony involved a situation where he was providing extrajudicial
information to the custody evaluator as part of his alleged "preparation for her testimony."
Although there is no evidence in the record that Respondent's counsel encouraged Margaret
Chapman to change her position set forth in her custody evaluation from an equal bonding
position to the father having a stronger bond with the child, this ex parte contact with
Respondent's counsel prior to her testimony at trial has to be suspect in that regard.
Nevertheless, the important point here is that the difference in the strength of the bond
between the child and his father and the child and his mother must be extremely small since
it is presumed (because there is no evidence in the record) that after the completion of the
custody evaluation there was no contact between the custody evaluator and the child and
his mother, or the child and his father. The only evidence of contacts in that time period
was between the evaluator and Respondent and Respondent's counsel. There is no evidence
whatsoever of any contacts between the time of the completion of the custody evaluation
and the time of trial between Ms. Chapman and Petitioner or Petitioner's counsel. This
Court is asked to find that if there was any greater bonding between the child and his father
than there was with his mother, it was not consequential enough to justify the change of
custody in this case.
When Petitioner attacked thisfindingof fact on the part of the judge in her opening
brief, she marshaled the evidence regarding the testimony of Respondent's witness Vern
Gerald Thamert, who stated he generally agreed with the testimony of Ms. Chapman,
although he admitted that he was retained only for the purpose of reviewing her report and
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had not spoken with any of the parties or the minor child (R. 725, pp. 134, 135).
Furthermore, Mr. Thamert made it clear that the only information he received in the case
came from reviewing the custody evaluation (home study information) and by talking
directly with Ms. Chapman. (R. 725, p. 139). Therefore, Mr. Thamert totally based his
opinion agreeing with Ms. Chapman on the bonding issue upon his conversations with Ms.
Chapman. And, of course, Ms. Chapman would want to bolster her statements in the
custody evaluation in talking with Mr. Thamert. Mr. Thamert's opinion was thus based
totally on hearsay, and specifically the hearsay presented to him by Ms. Chapman.
As an interesting note here, the following exchange took place on recross examination
of Mr. Thamert:
Q (BY MR. CHIPMAN) Okay. And let me ask you this question: You and Mrs.
Chapman are two of a few evaluators, licensed clinical social workers, in the
southern Utah area, is that correct?
A Yes, it is.
Q Would there be less than ten in St. George and Cedar City?
A Yes.
Q Less than five?
A Yes.
Q You and Mrs. Chapman do the -- predominantly all of the evaluations down there;
is that correct?
A I would say so. There are a couple of other people who do.
R. 725 p. 148, 149.
What seems abundantly clear then, although it apparently was not clear to the trial
judge, is that Mr. Thamert and Ms. Chapman have a close relationship and it certainly
cannot be considered unusual that he would come in and fortify her opinion by merely
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regurgitating it himself. This process of having a party call in an unappointed custody
evaluator to fortify and reiterate the opinion of the court-appointed custody evaluator is
specifically prohibited by Rule 4-903(2^ of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration which
specifically provides: "In divorce cases, one evaluator shall perform the evaluation on both
parties and shall submit a written report to the court. ..". Clearly, it was the intention of
the framers of this rule to avoid a situation where each side called numerous custody
evaluators in an attempt to overwhelm the judge with their opinions. Although Petitioner
admits that the testimony of Mr. Thamert was not objected to at the time of trial, and the
issue presented herein was not raised before the trial judge, Petitioner suggests that this use
of an unappointed custody evaluator to support, through hearsay only, the opinion of the
court-appointed custody evaluator is plain error, and constitutes the exceptional
circumstances which would allow this Court to consider the issue for the first time on
appeal In the case of State in Interest ofRMJ., 908 P.2d 345 (Utah App. 1995), this Court
specifically held:
Failure to argue plain error or exceptional circumstances is usually fatal to
an appellant's claim (made for the first time on appeal) (citing cases).
However, in an extremely narrow set of circumstances, court-made rules
and doctrines in furtherance of judicial efficiency and equity must give way
when the central issue to be decided concerns the best interests of a child.
See, e.g., State ex. rel. J.L.W., 900 P.2d 543, 549 (Utah App. 1995) ("[I]t is
inappropriate to consider application of so called equitable doctrines or
those which promote mere judicial efficiency at the expense of a child's
welfare."); Larson v. Larson, 888 P.2d 719, 722 n. 2 (Utah App. 1994) . .
. State ex. rel. J.J.T., 877 P.2d 161, 164 (Utah App. 1994) (,f[I]t cannot be
persuasively argued that judicial economy or the convenience afforded by
finality of legal controversies must override the concern for a child's
welfare").
908 P.2d at 350 (emphasis added).
In the R.N.J. case cited above, the Utah Court of Appeals defined what it meant by
plain error as follows:
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Two requirements must be met to find plain error. First, the error must
be "plain" such that "from our examination of the record, we must be able
to say that it should have been obvious to a trial court that it was
committing error." Citing State v. Eldredge, 111 P.2d 29, 35 (Utah), cert,
denied, 493 U.S. 814, 110 S.Ct. 62, 107 L.Ed.2d 29 (1989). Second, the
error must be prejudicial to the appellant. Id.
908 P.2d at 351.
It is the position of Petitioner that the court clearly should have recognized that under
Rule 4-903(2) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, it could only appoint one
evaluator in this case. Although that rule also provides for the appointment of a second
custody evaluator if a party resides out of state, the court did not appoint Vern Gerald
Thamert as an expert witness to do a custody evaluation in this case. Therefore, the court
committed plain error because it should have been obvious to the trial court that allowing
the testimony of Mr. Thamert to fortify and buttress the testimony of Ms. Chapman was not
appropriate.
Therefore, it is the position of Petitioner that the change in testimony of Margaret
Chapman, and the error of the court in allowing Gerald Thamert to testify constituted
reversible error in this case and should result in a reversal of the trial court's judgment.
Furthermore, Petitioner argues that even if the foregoing were not true, the apparent slight
difference in bonding with the father and the mother is not significant enough to justify
changing the custody of the minor child in a situation where the child has been found by the
trial court to be thriving, well adjusted and happy in his then present environment with his
Petitioner mother.
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POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES
AGAINST PETITIONER AND THIS COURT SHOULD NOT
AWARD FEES ON APPEAL
A. The trial court erred in awarding attorney's fees to Respondent for matters relating to
post-trial motions.
Respondent fails to respond to Petitioner's argument made in her opening brief that
the court abused its discretion and should have denied Respondent's Motion for Attorney's
Fees. Petitioner argued that the mere fact that the court may have ruled against Petitioner
on her Motion for New Trial and her Rule 60(b)(1) Motion for Relief from Judgment is not
a basis for granting attorney's fees with no other factors considered. Both motions are
certainly legitimate under Utah law and the arguments made in the motions are indeed
arguable and appropriate positions taken by Petitioner. While it may be true that the court
found that certain affidavits should not have been submitted, the court totally misanalyzed
the argument made by Petitioner.
Although the trial court may have concluded that the affidavits should be stricken based
upon the decision in Barnard v. Sutliff, 846 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme Court
in that case noted:
2. We note that Barnard could have resubmitted the affidavits under rule
60(b)(1), which allows the court, "upon such terms as are just" and "in the
furtherance of justice," to relieve a party from an order for "mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." Utah R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1).
Barnard did not proceed under this rule, and on appeal, we will not
construe a motion for new trial as a Rule 60(b) motion because the trial
court should have thefirstopportunity to consider the issue on Rule 60(b)
grounds.
846 P.2d 1235, n.2.
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Since Petitioner in the instant case included the affidavits stricken in the Rule 60(b)(1)
motion, the trial court committed error by striking them and awarding attorney's fees on
that basis.
It should be noted also that although the trial judge struck the affidavits of Jillynn
Stevens and Dr. Carol Mellen, as well as specific letters of reference attached to the
Affidavit of Petitioner Abby Hudema, the court did not strike the affidavit of Petitioner.
At no point in its "Ruling on Respondent's Motion for Attorney's Fees" did the court
suggest that the Motion for New Trial, Motion for Relief From Judgment, or any of the
other post-trial motionsfiledby Petitioner, were "frivolous." The court merely indicated that
it would award attorney's fees based upon the filing of the two affidavits and the letters
attached to Petitioner's affidavit.
B.

The instant appeal is not frivolous, and attorney's fees should not be awarded on
appeal.
Although in his conclusion of his brief Respondent claims that Petitioner is fVindictive",

Petitioner suggests that the only vindictiveness shown in the briefing process has been by
Respondent and his attorney. In the 32 pages of Respondent's brief, he spends much time
personally attacking Petitioner's counsel and Petitioner herself. Such personal attacks are
unprofessional, inappropriate and not called for in this particular case. Respondent's
counsel even goes so far to suggest in his brief that this entire appeal is, in and of itself,
"frivolous". See Resp.Br. pp. 27-29.
Petitioner maintains that it is incomprehensible and irresponsible for anyone to suggest
an appeal is frivolous where the trial court considered the case a "close call"; where the
court removed a child who had thrived happily with his mother as primary caretaker for five
and a half years; where the court found the mother to have done an "excellent job"; where
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the court felt so much confidence in the mother that he would leave the child with her for
another six months after making his decision to change custody.
Respondent also claims in his brief that Petitioner has "mis-characterized and misstated
the evidence to this court by setting forth arguments and referring to exhibits which were
stricken by the trial court (sic)." (Resp.Br. p. 29).
Petitioner adamantly maintains that there has been no misstatement or
mischaracterization of the evidence whatsoever. The mere fact that counsel may view the
evidence from different perspectives does not suggest that the evidence has been misstated.
Rather, Respondent's arrogance in constantly personally attacking Petitioner and Petitioner's
counsel comes through loud and clear in the unprofessional and inappropriate statements
made in his brief.

The mere fact that an attorney alleges mischaracterization or

misstatement of evidence certainly does not make it so. A brief review of the alleged
mischaracterization and misstatements is as follows:
1. Respondent claims that Petitioner misstated the previously determined custody
arrangements in this case. As stated previously, the parties stipulated and agreed to a
provision in the original Decree of Divorce which provided for joint legal custody, but sole
physical custody in the Petitioner with the minimum visitation rights allowed under the law
for Respondent. There is no misstatement whatsoever in Petitioner's brief about this
previously determined custody arrangement. Although Respondent would like to distinguish
some of the cases Petitioner has relied upon which talk about the importance of the court's
consideration of the previously determined custody arrangements where the child is happy
and well adjusted, his claim that there was no previously determined custody arrangement
with sole physical custody in Respondent is simply wrong! (R. 24,25). Respondent's flawed
logic in this regard comes out in his flat statement, "The fact is, the parties were awarded
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joint legal custody of the minor child and there was no previously determined custody
arrangement . .". Resp.Br. p. 18. In order to draw this conclusion, Respondent has to
completely ignore the fact that he stipulated to the sole physical custody of the minor child
to be awarded to Petitioner, with him receiving only the minimum visitation rights under the
law. How can any reasonable person suggest, as Respondent's counsel has done, that "there
was no previously determined custody arrangement"?
This factor to be considered by the court in child custody evaluations found in Rule 4903(3)(D) clearly is an indication that the framers of the rule intended that the court should
review the situation existing between the child and his or her primary caretaker based upon
previously determined custody arrangements, whether that custody be legal custody or
physical custody. As indicated previously in this brief, the minor child had been living with
Petitioner, who was his primary caretaker, for at least the three and a half years since the
divorce in this case prior to the date of trial on the Petition for Modification. Respondent's
suggestion that there was "no previously determined custody arrangement" is disingenuous
at best and should be disregarded by the Court.
2. Respondent also argues that somehow Petitioner's "claim of error in the custody
evaluator and the court's procedure due to the fact that no psychological tests were
conducted on the minor child constitutes a misstatement by Petitioner and yet another
attempt to manipulate the facts in hopes that this Court will not conduct a thorough review
of the record .. ." {Resp.Br. p. 22). However, Petitioner at no time alleged in her opening
brief that psychological tests were required in this case, but simply assigned as error the fact
that none were given to the minor child to determine the impact of the change of custody
on the child. There is no misstatement of the evidence in this regard by Petitioner.

25

However, Respondent specifically misstates the evidence when he makes the flat
statement, "What is ironic about this argument set forth by Petitioner is that she considered
psychological testing and, in fact, it was mentioned to her by her second attorney, Mr. Brent
R. Chipman (R. 487). However, the Petitioner, for whatever reason, elected not to undergo
psychological testing even though it was suggested to her by former counsel." Resp.Br. p.
22. If the Court reviews the citation provided by Respondent's counsel, the evidence in
question is thefirstpage of a letter sent by Petitioner's counsel to Petitioner and contained
as an exhibit to Petitioner's post-trial affidavit in support of her post-trial motions. A
reading of the last paragraph of that letter does not suggest that the attorney is
recommending psychological testing for the minor child, but is simply discussing the pros
and cons of psychological testing of the parties in this case. (R. 487). It was clearly not
"suggested to her by her former counsel" in the evidence cited by Respondent. Again, if
there is any misstatement of the record and the evidence, it is by Respondent's counsel and
not Petitioner's counsel.
3. Respondent accuses Petitioner of misstating the evidence with regard to Margaret
Chapman failing to give adequate consideration to the principle of "the general interest in
continuing the previously determined custody arrangements where the child is happy and
well adjusted." Yet again, Respondent has completely misanalyzed and misunderstood the
claim of Petitioner in an effort to allege that Petitioner has somehow misstated the evidence.
In her opening brief on page 45, Petitioner presents the argument that the Chapman
evaluation isflawedbecause the evaluator failed to pay the kind of attention required under
Utah law to the issue of the general interest in continuing previously determined custody
arrangements where the child is happy and well adjusted. Petitioner pointed out that the
evaluator, in her entire nine-page evaluation, devoted only four lines, or three sentences, to
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this important issue. Petitioner also pointed out that she failed to provide the trial court
with any information regarding how well the minor child has adjusted in his new Arizona
home; and failed to provide any information whatsoever regarding Jackson's relationship
with his mother in this section of her report. There was simply no misstatement or
mischaracterization of this evidence. Respondent simply misanalyzed Petitioner's argument.
4. Respondent finally argues that Petitioner should not be allowed to cite from the
stricken affidavits of Jillynn Stevens and Dr. Carol Mellen as was done in the opening brief
because they were stricken in the lower court and Petitioner did not assign the failure to
admit these affidavits as error. Again Respondent misanalyzes and mischaracterizes
Petitioner's argument in this regard. Citing the stricken exhibits, Petitioner clearly pointed
out that the exhibit had been stricken by the lower court. There was no attempt to mislead
this Court in that regard. Furthermore, the mere fact that a lower court may strike
testimony or evidence legitimately presented to it during the course of proceedings is not
a basis to suggest that the stricken evidence or exhibit cannot be referred to on appeal, and
Respondent cites no cases suggesting otherwise. It is implicit in Petitioner's assignments of
error and argument that the trial court erred in its ultimate ruling and determination. The
filing of a Motion for New Trial and other post-trial motions were designed to give the
lower court an opportunity to correct its errors. The lower court denied those motions, and
to the extent that these motions were designed to allow the trial court to correct its errors
during the trial, error is assigned to the court's failure to grant the post-trial motions.
In addition, Petitioner explicitly assigned as error in her opening brief the failure of the
lower court to grant her Motion for New Trial and Motion to Open Judgment Pursuant to
Rule 59(a) and order a second custody evaluation in Point V of the opening brief discussing
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the issue that the custody evaluation wasflawedand procedurally unfair, and the trial court's
reliance upon the evaluator's opinion thus constituted reversible error.3
Therefore, surely the Court can see that the allegations of Respondent that this appeal
is frivolous, without merit, inaccurate, misleading and burdensome is absolutely false! If
there was any mischaracteiization or misstatement of evidence, it was not on the part of
Petitioner. While attorneys may disagree with regard to analysis and evaluation of evidence
or cases, it is highly inappropriate for Respondent to accuse Petitioner of deliberately
misstating or mischaracterizing evidence when such is clearly not the case, so that he can
make a motion for an award of attorney's fees on appeal.
The case of Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395 (Utah 1987) cited by Respondent as
supporting the position that attorney's fees should be awarded on appeal in this matter,
makes clear that "[T]he Court recognizes the right of a party to argue in an attempt to
correct what that party deems to be error in the court below." 735 P.2d at 397. In that
case, the Utah Supreme Court held that "The totality of defendant's argument compels this
court tofindthat he is attempting to take unconscionable advantage of his wife and that this
appeal is frivolous." 735 P.2d at 398.
This appeal does not consist of an effort to take unconscionable advantage of anyone,
but is a legitimate effort to correct what petitioner deems to be error in the court below.
Therefore, this Court should reject the request for fees on appeal.
As an aside to this argument, Petitioner notes that in his conclusion, Respondent
accuses her of being 'Vindictive".

Respondent cites two examples of this alleged

3

Pet.Op.Br. p. 45: "The fact that no specific consideration has been given to this
issue is reversible error and another reason why the Chapman evaluation is flawed and
the court should have granted Petitioner's Motion to Open Judgment Pursuant to Rule
59(a) and a new custody evaluation, and/or granted Petitioner's Motion for New Trial."
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vindictiveness by discussing a letter submitted to a reference which was favorable to
Respondent and appears in the record at R. 120 Ex. 11. Interestingly enough, a review of
that particular letter reveals that Petitioner was merely expressing her disappointment that
a good friend and neighbor had chosen to take sides in this custody dispute, and expressing
the hope that what Petitioner was going through would never happen to the neighbor. The
letter expresses disappointment, but not vindictiveness; and the Court is asked to read it to
determine whether or not it believes it is vindictive.
The second allegation of vindictiveness is based upon a letter sent to Respondent's wife
which stated she should only contact Petitioner in case of emergency. R. 120 Ex. 2.
However, the allegation that this correspondence was vindictive, is again misplaced.
Petitioner testified that Respondent's new wife would often call under circumstances where
she would give extremely short notice that Respondent was going to pick up the minor child
for visitation. When Petitioner would talk about the short notice in question, Respondent's
new wife would scream at her on the phone and ask whether or not she was refusing them
visitation. Petitioner indicated it was simply very difficult to communicate with her, and she
had to go back and ask Respondent what he wanted to do about the situation anyway.
There is nothing vindictive in Petitioner wanting to deal directly with the father of the minor
child, rather than continuing to have difficult conversations with the father's new wife. (R.
725 p. 107).
In sum then, the allegations of vindictiveness on the part of Petitioner are simply not
true, and are not relevant even if they were true. Again, in the 32 pages of his brief,
Respondent expresses far more vindictiveness than either of the two examples he cited to
allegedly show Petitioner's vindictiveness.
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CONCLUSION
Petitioner is not requesting this Court's sympathy, but is simply requesting that this
Court review the briefs and arguments of counsel, as well as the record in this case, and
determine whether or not the trial judge misapplied the law in deciding to remove a child
from his custodial parent and primary caretaker for five and a half years; while allowing the
child to finish kindergarten with his custodial parent, and thus delaying the transfer of
custody for over six months after he made his decision requiring the custody change.
Petitioner respectfully requests that the order of the lower court modifying the Decree
of Divorce to change custody from the minor child's primary caretaker, as well as the trial
court's award of attorney's fees against Petitioner, be reversed. The best interest of the
minor child, and the interests of justice compel such a result.
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